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The paper models the incentives of a politician to delegate the decision making
power in a sovereign wealth fund to an independent external manager. It formalizes
the learning-e⁄ects as well as the increase of transparency of the SWF and the rise of
investment possibilities associated with higher transparency. It also focuses on the
role of elections as a basic mechanism to control and discipline politicians. I show
that the politician has incentives for strategic behaviour if voters have incomplete
information about his competence. The paper also studies when the delegation of
decision making power is socially optimal and under which circumstances it takes
place.
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11 Introduction
Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are not a new phenomenon in the global ￿nancial system,
even if this term was de￿ned recently (Rozanov 2005). Although the ￿rst well-known
SWFs were established in early 1950s (Kuwait, Kiribati) and during the 1970s (Abu
Dhabi, Singapore), the international debate about the role of the latter was activated only
a little while ago. The rise of SWFs in the front of important global structural changes has
stimulated concerns about ambitions and investing strategies of SWFs and encouraged
the international discussion about the importance and functions of state-owned investors.
The global imbalances, the running current account surpluses of emerging countries and
the US twin de￿cits (Bernanke 2007) as well as the ￿nancial turmoil of recent years have
been supporting varying beliefs and understandings of SWFs.
The change in perception of SWFs and the adjustment of the public opinion about this
phenomenon is remarkable. While not so long ago the SWFs were seen as one of the vicious
instruments of state-owned capitalism, in times of the ￿nancial crisis and global depression
they became ￿white knights￿for cash-strapped companies and attractive buyers of last
resort (Couturier et al. 2009). Presently, the SWFs are interpreted as symbols of a shift
in global power, and this raises again questions about the possible abuse of markets and
fears that SWFs will be used for political and strategic goals (Hassan 2009). In the early
stages, the most meaningful arguments for justi￿cation of this concerns were the lack of
transparency and the opaque nature of most funds.
Thus, the fears and doubt were materialised and mutated into protectionist actions
against this important class of ￿nancial market participants and their investments. For
example, there was Nicolas Sarkozy￿ s ￿attack￿ on SWFs in 2007 (Elliott 2007). The
European Commission was also worried that
￿... SWFs￿investments may be driven by considerations other than maximi-
sation of return... More generally, business and investment decisions could
be in￿ uenced in the political interest of the SWFs￿owners. Concerns about
SWFs￿operations are inevitably fuelled by the opaque way in which some of
them operate1￿(European Commission 2008).
There are similar arguments and ideas in the academic literature. Gilson and Milhaupt
(2008) argued that SWFs have to give up their shareholder voting rights in order to avoid
the in￿ uence of their strategic behaviour on the governance of ￿rms they are holding. Two
prominent examples or well-known and often discussed cases of the protectionist practice
against SWFs￿investments are the Dubai Ports World and CFIUS (Committee of Foreign
1Emphases are added.
2Investment in the United States) controversy2 and the failed 2005 bid for Unocal by the
government controlled China National O⁄shore Oil Corporation (CNOOC).
On the one hand, the incidents mentioned above led to the establishment of institutions
like International Working Group (IWG) on SWFs and to the attempt to develop some
game rules for both SWF hosting (￿Santiago Principles￿ ) (IWG 2008) and investments
recipient countries (OECD 2008). One the other hand, they motivated thoughts about
legitimacy of SWFs and their governance (Monk 2009). Indices developed and used to
measure the transparency and governance of SWFs, like Linaburg-Maduell Transparency
Index (SWF Institute) or Truman￿ s scoreboard for SWFs (Truman 2008), include the
involvement of external managers as a point that delivers positive scores for a SWF and
makes it less opaque. The academic literature stresses the outsourcing of the management
of SWFs as a way to signal the commercial nature of their investments (Rozanov 2009).
And the practice shows that more and more SWFs allocate some of their funds to external
managers or try to join forces with private funds. For example, one of the largest SWFs,
the Singaporean SWF Temasek, has set up a new investment company called SeaTown
Holdings that would act as an externally managed sovereign fund. By launching this
new investment vehicle Temasek tries to insert an additional layer between the SWF and
investee companies.
￿... SeaTown Holdings, a wholly-owned global investment company, operates
and makes its investment decisions independently...￿(Temasek 2010).
in order to alleviate concerns about non-commercial investment behaviour and ensure
international legitimacy.
Bortolotti et al. (2010) deliver empirical evidence for the ￿Constrained Foreign In-
vestor Hypothesis￿which predicts that
￿relatively transparent funds ... will be less constrained in their investment
targets and might be able to generate positive long run returns from their
investments.￿(Bortolotti et al. 2010).
According to Rozanov (2009), the outsourcing of SWFs￿management and thus the
compliance of ￿Santiago Principles￿increase the transparency of a particular SWF and
eliminate the concerns about strategic behaviour of the fund. In turn, this improves the
investment possibilities and results in higher returns. These logical implications seem to
give an answer to the important question: Why do politicians give away some decision
making power and delegate policy tasks to an independent external manager?
2For more information about the Dubai Ports World controversy see Zunes (2006).
3I use a simple model as a tool to describe the incentives which underlie the politician￿ s
decision to delegate the management of the sovereign wealth fund to an independent exter-
nal manager. The basis of the theoretical framework forms a simple cost-bene￿t analysis
of the delegation from the o¢ ce-holding politician￿ s perspective. I formalise the motives
of delegation: learning-e⁄ects (Arrow 1962) as well as the increase of transparency of the
SWF and the rise of investment possibilities associated with higher transparency. The
latter represents the innovative building block of the model. The ￿Constrained Foreign
Investor Hypothesis￿mentioned by Bortolotti et al. (2010) re￿ ects a similar idea but in
the context of SWF￿ s investment patterns. Additionally, I build in two disciplining mech-
anisms with regard to the politician and to the external manager: elections and career
concerns of the external manager. The model developed in this paper builds on the theory
of elections as a disciplining mechanism and on the analysis of policiy task delegation.
The role of elections as a mechanism which controls the o¢ ceholder and helps to achieve
accountability of elected politicians to the citizens is analysed in theoretical works by
Barro (1973), Ferejohn (1986) as well as by Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997). In
models following the Barro-Ferejohn tradition politicians are identical and thus voters
are ex post indi⁄erent about which candidate they vote for. In this case the reelection
motive controls moral hazard on the side of the incumbent inducing him to act on behalf
of voters￿interests. I use the extension of this framework with heterogeneous politicians
introduced by Maskin and Tirole (2004) which allows analysing adverse selection through
election mechanism. In this regard, the model in this paper is also closely related to that
developed by Berganza (2000).
The modeling of policy tasks delegation combines components used by Eggertsson
and Le Borgne (2007) and Alesina and Tabellini (2007). The delegation decision made
by politician trades-o⁄ the costs of having an incompetent manager which cannot be
dismissed against the bene￿ts from transparency, learning e⁄ects and career concerns of
the external manager. The function of career concerns of the external manager is similar
to that provided by Holmstr￿m (1999). This important mechanism delivering incentives
for politicians and civil servants has been analysed also by Tirole (1994).
Thus, the theoretical framework I adopt combines well elaborated components as well
as innovative building blocks that allows an suitable and useful application of the policy
task delegation theory to the highly discussed sovereign wealth funds. The intention of
the paper is to stimulate the interest in the management outsourcing issues in SWFs
and to deliver some formal arguments and explanatory statements that will facilitate the
further academic debate and provide policy decision takers with helpful background.
I ￿nd that the increase of SWF￿ s average productivity as a consequence of management
outsourcing and higher transparency improves social welfare. However, the in￿ uence of
fund￿ s increased productivity on the politician￿ s delegation motivation is strongly linked
4to the competence level of the o¢ ceholder and to the character of the SWF: The positive
e⁄ect is strongest if there is a SWF providing public goods (for example, an infrastructure
fund). Another ￿nding is that if the delegation occurs, it is socially optimal if the ego-
rent of holding the o¢ ce is small enough. Higher private bene￿ts from a political o¢ ce
deliver incentives for the incompetent politician to delegate the policy task in order to get
a reelection chance even if the expected output from the external managerial regime is
small. However, the reverse is not true, i.e. under certain circumstances the management
of SWF won￿ t be delegated even if the delegation improves social welfare.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 describes
the politician as a manager of SWF and the output generated under this regime. Section
4 characterises the output of a SWF produced with an external manager. Section 5
compares the welfare results of both regimes and section 6 derives the conditions under
which delegation takes place. Section 7 concludes. Appendix contains technical details.
2 The model framework
Consider a simple economy where total output is de￿ned as the result of the sovereign
wealth fund run by an individual ￿managing￿this fund. There are two periods, 1 and
2, and the output y1 of the period 1 is given as follows (based on Persson, Roland and
Tabellini 1997):
y1 = ￿1 (e ￿ r1) (1)
The parameter ￿t is a random variable, describing the ￿competence level￿or ability of
an ￿o¢ ceholder￿to manage the SWF well in each period. I assume that ￿t is uniformly






with expected value of 1. Each elected candi-
date observes his own ability but nobody else does. The o¢ ceholder has a possibility to
extract personal rents rt by investing in ￿pet￿projects4. Since investing in political ￿pet￿
projects is not based on output maximization of the SWF, extracting personal rents is a
strategy that diverts the resources of SWF. The levels of rents extracted in each period
are publicly unobservable so that, if SWF performs badly, the voters are not able to ￿nd
out if it is due to the bad competence of the SWF manager or to his resource-diverting
behaviour. I make an additional assumption about the maximum possible level of rents
to be extracted5: rmax = ￿ r < e. The parameter e characterizes the output level of an
3I assume that the competence-level of the same person remains constant over time, but I use the
index t for ￿ to emphasize that there is a possibility of another ￿o¢ ceholder￿in the second period.
4This can be done, for example, through investing in some industries due to personal interests of
o¢ ceholder.
5This assumption is not as strict as it seems to be. The expression for yt = ￿t (e ￿ rt) together
with yt ￿ 0 implies that rt ￿ e a condition which Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997) call a resource
constraint limiting the maximum amount that can be diverted by the executive. I just make an additional
assumption that rt 6= e which in turn implies that yt = 0 appears if and only if ￿t = 0.
5average SWF, i.e. a SWF run by the o¢ ceholder with average competence level of ￿t = 1
who is not diverting any resources.
If the ￿rst-period o¢ ceholder is reelected and manages the SWF also in the second
period, it is assumed that there are learning-by-doing e⁄ects (Eggertsson and Le Borgne
2007), so that the output in the second period increases:
y2 = ￿2 (e ￿ r2) + ￿ (2)
where the parameter ￿ > 0 is interpreted as the increase of the level of output due to the
experience of the politician who manages the SWF.
In case of a new o¢ ceholder output y2 of the period 2 is given by:
y2 = ￿2 (e ￿ r2) (3)
The representative voter is interested in maximizing his expected utility that is de￿ned
as a share of output of SWF consumed:
u(y) = ￿y1 + ￿y2 (4)
where 0 < ￿ ￿ 1 gives the share of output that is consumed by each individual member
of the economy6.
The utility of a politician over two periods is given by the share of output he consumes
as ￿regular￿member of the society, by personal rents extracted from o¢ ce and by one-time
ego-rent R received if he is reelected7:
v = ￿y1 + r1 + ￿(R + r2) + ￿y2 (5)
where ￿ = 1 if politician is reelected for second period and 0 otherwise.
Both the politician and voters are risk neutral so that risk sharing problems do not
arise.
3 Politician as a manager of SWF
Once the politician decides to manage a SWF by himself, the only relevant choice variable
for each period, given his competence level that he observes, is rt. The timing of model is
as follows: At the beginning of period 1, voters build some beliefs about the ￿desirable￿
6If ￿ = 1 then it is a SWF producing a public good (for example, an infrastructure fund or a fund
with main objective to enhance a technology level of whole country). If ￿ is small enough (like ￿ = 1
n
with n the number of members of society) then the SWF is something like a pension fund.
7For simplicity I assume that the discount factor equals one.
6level of output ~ y for the end of a period (determined below) and communicate this to the
politician. In the real world the politicians never receive an unambiguous message from
voters and thus never know exactly the required level of diligence. However, in this model
framework I assume that the politician knows the voters￿voting rule, allowing thereby
the communication of ~ y to the politician. The o¢ ceholder picks his ￿rst period level of
personal rents r1 which in combination with his competence gives a ￿rst period output of
SWF y1. The elections are held at the end of the ￿rst period. If the SWF managed by the
politician produces at least the reference level of output, the politician is identi￿ed as a
competent one and is reelected for the second period. Otherwise voters randomly select a
new politician from a pool of candidates with random ￿. So the challengers are available
to be elected but play no active role in order to compete against each other or against
the incumbent. Once reelected, the politician obtains the ego-rent R and the possibility
to choose r2 and to produce the output y2.
Figure 1: The timing of the model
3.1 Politician￿ s decision
The decision for the second period is trivial. Each politician, independently of being an
incumbent or a new one8, maximizes his second period utility without reelection concerns9:
r2 = argmaxfr2 + ￿￿(e ￿ r2)g (6)





￿ r if ￿ ￿ 1
￿
0 if ￿ > 1
￿
(7)
8The only di⁄erence between the incumbent and a new politician is their output level generated in
the period two (equations (8) and (9)). However, the results of the optimisation calculus are the same
for both.
9The period 2 is the last period and there are no further elections.
7This condition shows that if the politician is ￿competent￿enough, he does not have any
reasons to divert resources. The fund managed by him produces an output high enough,
so that the share of this output consumed is higher than the possible amount of diverted





￿(e ￿ ￿ r) if ￿ ￿ 1
￿
￿e if ￿ > 1
￿






￿(e ￿ ￿ r) + ￿ if ￿ ￿ 1
￿
￿e + ￿ if ￿ > 1
￿
in case of the same o¢ ceholder (9)
As one can see, in both cases voters are interested in the competence level of the o¢ ce-
holder and therefore try to elect the candidate with higher ￿.
Things become less trivial when the decision for the ￿rst period is made. The incum-
bent observes his own competence level ￿ and knows the required level of output ~ y. If the
politician realises that his ￿ is small and he cannot produce ~ y even if he is not diverting
any resources10 (i.e. ￿e < ~ y), he will have an incentive to divert the maximum possible
amount of resources (but only if ￿ ￿ 1
￿, otherwise the opportunity costs of diverting are
too high, and he will try to produce the maximum possible output given his competence
level without diverting). In the case that the incumbent decides to produce ~ y, he has to
choose




The incumbent selects ~ r1 if and only if his expected utility from this action is not smaller
than the expected utility from any alternative level of ^ r1:
￿~ y + ~ r1 + R + r
￿
2 + ￿y2 (r
￿
2) ￿ ￿y1 (^ r1) + ^ r1 + E f￿y2 (r
￿
2)g (11)
where the last term on the right-hand side of the inequality is the expected value of the
output consumed, given that the incumbent is not reelected and the decision is made by
a new politician.
There are two possible cases:
1. Incumbent with ￿ ￿ 1
￿ (low competence)
In this case, the condition (11) turns into:
￿~ y + e ￿
~ y
￿
+ R + ￿ r + ￿￿(e ￿ ￿ r) + ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿(e ￿ ￿ r) + ￿ r + ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ (e ￿ ￿ r) (12)
10One can think about negative rents in this case and try to interpret this as some additional ￿e⁄ort￿
of the o¢ ceholder, but I restrict rt ￿ 0
8where the randomly elected new politician is expected to be of average competence
level 1, hence his optimal choice of r￿
2 = ￿ r (because 1 ￿ 1
￿).




￿~ y + ￿￿ r + e(1 ￿ ￿) + R + ￿￿
(13)
One can see that higher bene￿ts from holding the o¢ ce (i.e. e, R, ￿ and ￿ r) lead
even less competent politicians to choose ~ r1 and to generate the required level of
output. Nevertheless, higher required levels of output ~ y can be produced with more
competent politicians and this implies a higher ￿
￿.
2. Incumbent with ￿ > 1
￿ (high competence)
In this case, the condition (11) shrinks to:
￿~ y + e ￿
~ y
￿




￿ ￿~ y + R + ￿￿ + e(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿￿ r (15)




< ￿~ y ￿ ￿~ y + R + ￿￿ + e(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿￿ r (16)
the condition always holds. In other words, the incumbent de￿nitely tends to select
~ r1 and produces ~ y. But due to his ￿high￿competence, he actually selects r1 = 0,
produces higher output, is reelected and bene￿ts from higher output.
To summarise again, ￿good￿incumbents (with ￿ > 1
￿) are never diverting and are
always reelected. ￿Bad￿incumbents are never reelected and therefore divert in the ￿rst
period the maximum possible amount of resources. There are also some other competence
levelled politicians (they may be higher-than-average), who have incentives to divert re-
sources but are still reelected despite this.
3.2 Voters￿decision rule
Now the decision rationales of voters are formalised. I assume that the voters￿decision
rule is myopic, i. e. they decide to reelect the incumbent if he generates higher expected
output in the second period relative to a new politician who can be randomly elected as
an alternative (Berganza 2000). Therefore, voters set their required level of output for
9the ￿rst period ~ y so that ￿




￿~ y + ￿￿ r + e(1 ￿ ￿) + R + ￿￿
= 1 (17)
This implies:
~ y = e +
R + ￿￿ + ￿￿ r
1 ￿ ￿
(18)
This level of ~ y together with equation (10) leads to:













The voters￿decision rule together with an appropriate communication of the level of
output desired for the ￿rst period makes it possible to select a politician for the second
period that has a higher-than-average competence level. The incumbent is also disciplined
by the voters due to the fact that he faces an intertemporal trade-o⁄: if he diverts too
much today, he will be removed from o¢ ce and will not have a possibility to extract rents
tomorrow.
4 External manager in the SWF
Now the output of the SWF is analysed when it is managed by an external manager who
does not face any elections and once hired, can hold the o¢ ce for both periods. The
engagement of an external manager increases the transparency of the SWF in the eyes
of the rest of the world and probably eliminates the concerns about strategic behaviour
of the fund11. This has a positive impact on the investment possibilities and portfolio
diversi￿cation options of a particular SWF, because it eliminates the protectionist resis-
tance from the rest of the world (Rozanov 2009). This e⁄ect is modeled by describing the
output of SWF run by a professional external manager just as:
y1 = ￿
m (e
m ￿ r1) (20)
y2 = ￿
m (e
m ￿ r2) + ￿ (21)
where the parameter ￿
m without time index is the competence of the external manager
with ￿long-term￿contract to run the SWF. The parameter em ￿ e captures the positive
e⁄ect of increasing average output due to improved transparency of the SWF managed by
11For the transparency issues in general compare Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index (SWF Insti-
tute) or Truman￿ s scoreboard for SWFs (Truman 2008), specially the governance as well as transparency
and accountability components. Both measures include the involving of external managers as a point
that delivers positive scores for a SWF.
10an external manager12. It is assumed that the manager is able to extract personal rents
as well. The utility of a manager over two periods is given on the one hand by the share
of output he consumes as ￿regular￿member of the society and by rents extracted at the
o¢ ce. On the other hand, I assume that the manager has some ￿career concerns￿ , i.e. at
the end of the ￿rst period he obtains an output-related rent. One can interpret this rent
just as a payment or prize for the ￿best manager￿in this simple world. Indeed, there is
another possibility to interpret this ￿rst period output-related rent as a reputational rent,
i.e. the manager is concerned with his reputation in the eyes of the society for the case
that he decides to resign from his job in the SWF and to ￿nd an alternative job in the
second period. The core idea here is that the manager has an additional incentive to signal
his ￿high￿ability and/or his ￿diligence￿through higher output levels in the ￿rst period
in order to get a chance for a better job in the second period. Hence, this reputational
rent allegorises manager￿ s chances for future alternative jobs. So the manager￿ s utility is
given as follows:
! = ￿y1 + r1 + ￿y2 + r2 + ￿y1 (22)
where career concerns of the manager linearly depend on the level of output produced in
the ￿rst period according to the coe¢ cient 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1.
Given that the manager knows his own competence level ￿
m, the only choice variables
























As a consequence of career concerns the manager tends to be more diligent or more careful
in diverting resources than the politician13. So the output levels produced under external




























12At this point one can think not only about involvement of an external manager but also about
transparency improving events in general, for example the compliance of ￿Santiago Principles￿ . This
increases the average return on investment in the same manner as described in model.
13￿ > 0 implies 1
￿+￿ < 1
￿.
115 Politician vs. external manager
In this section the expected output levels generated in the SWF under two alternative
managerial regimes are compared: politician with the prospect of elections (political man-
agement ￿PM) and external manager with career concerns (external management ￿EM).
It is shown under which conditions the external manager produces higher output than
the politician.
5.1 Output generated in the SWF with the politician
There are three possible cases to examine in order to describe the expected output of the
SWF with a politician as a manager. If the competence level of the o¢ ceholder is high
enough, he does not divert any resources in the ￿rst period (compare (7)), produces his
highest possible output level, is reelected for sure and does not extract resources in the
second period. If the incumbent identi￿es that his competence is low and he is not able
to generate the output required to be reelected, he extracts the highest possible level of
personal rents in the ￿rst period and is replaced by a new politician through elections.
The incumbent with the moderate competence level diverts some resources but generates
also the desired minimum level of output in the ￿rst period so as to be reelected and to
obtain the possibility of diverting the maximum in the second period. Hence the expected
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[E (~ y + ￿(e ￿ ￿ r) + ￿)] (27)
Given the distribution of ￿, equation (18) and the fact that E (￿







































5.2 Output generated in the SWF with the external manager
There are three possibilities to examine in order to describe the expected output of the
SWF with an external manager: Either the manager is competent enough so that he does
not divert resources and thus generates his maximum level of output, or his ability is low
so that he decides to extract the maximum possible level of rents in the second or both
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5.3 Comparison of outputs and the social optimum
From the social planner￿ s point of view the optimal choice of managerial regime for the
SWF maximises the expected output of the SWF. The expected outputs generated under
both alternative regimes are compared: A SWF run by an external manager performs












































One can see that higher ego-rents from holding the o¢ ce R make the SWF with a
PM performing better. The only reason of this is that a higher ego-rent implies a higher
required level of output as an electoral rule (compare (18)).
It is also obvious that an increase of the average output em due to the transparency
e⁄ect of involving an external manager improves the performance of the SWF.
Stronger career concerns deliver stronger incentives for the manager to generate higher
output, improving in this manner the case of external management.
There are two opposite learning e⁄ects to be weighed against each other: On the one
hand, the learning e⁄ect exists de￿nitely for the external manager due to the long term
job contract, while the politician is reelected only with probability 1
2. Hence the ￿pure￿
learning e⁄ect strengthens in sum the case of EM. But, on the other hand, there is also
a positive e⁄ect of learning-by-doing on the output level required by voters as an election
rule so that the expected output of the PM is higher. Thus, the aggregate e⁄ect depends
on the uncertainty about the politician￿ s competence given by ￿.
13Appendix A.3 contains the ￿rst derivatives of the condition (31) with respect to pa-
rameters ￿ r, ￿ and ￿. The derivative of the condition (31) with respect to the parameter
￿ describing the share of the SWFs output consumed by each member of society is pos-
itive. The in￿ uence of parameters ￿ r and ￿ on di⁄erences of outputs generated under
two alternative regimes is ambiguous and depends on parameters￿constellation because
of numerous opposite e⁄ects. For example, the maximum possible amount of diverted
resources ￿ r has an impact not only on the output level of each period generated under
two management regimes, but also on the output level required by voters as an election
rule for the politician.
6 Delegation of decision making power to an external
manager
This section analyses whether the incumbent has any incentives to delegate his policy
decision in the SWF to an external manager. In the case that the politician decides to
delegate, the output generated in the SWF will not signal his competence level. Thus,
the politician has no more in￿ uence on his reelection probability which is in this case 1
2.
Recall that, on the other hand, once hired, the external manager cannot be dismissed
from his job, even if he diverts resources or is incompetent. The long-term job contract
of the manager ensures his independence from politics and improves the governance and
transparency of the SWF signalling in this manner to the rest of world the pure commercial
nature of the SWF￿ s behaviour. Hence, the two relevant functions of elections - as a
disciplining mechanism for the o¢ ceholder and as a mechanism to select a competent
o¢ ceholder - disappear. On the bene￿t side of delegation, three positive e⁄ects are
identi￿ed: Increase of the transparency of a SWF and the associated raise of the average
output, career concerns that discipline the manager and create incentives to generate
greater output and the learning-by-doing e⁄ect which is in the case of the manager present
with probability 1. To sum up, the delegation decision made by politician trades-o⁄ the
costs of having an incompetent manager (who may be negligent as well) with a long-term
job contract against the bene￿ts from transparency, learning e⁄ects and career concerns.
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All possible cases for politician￿ s competence level are examined in Appendix A.4:
The ego-rent from holding the o¢ ce R
From point of view of the politician with low competence the EM is strengthened if the
ego-rent from holding the o¢ ce increases. The bad incumbent is sure to be not reelected,
while if he delegates the policy decision in SWF to an external manager, there will be a
reelection probability of 1
2 and an expected ego-rent of 1
2R. Thus, the increase of R makes
the delegation more preferable.
The higher the competence level of the incumbent, the less attractive is the delegation
of decision making if the ego-rent from holding the o¢ ce increases. There are two e⁄ects
to be weighed against each other: On the one hand, the reelection motive strengthens
the case of the PM with greater R. On the other hand, the level of ego-rent obtained
from holding the o¢ ce plays an important role for the voters￿required level of output
and thereby has also an in￿ uence on the personal rent extracted in the ￿rst period. The
greater R, the higher is the required level of output which implies smaller personal rents
in the ￿rst period. This processing tends to have a negative impact on the expected
utility of the incumbent in the PM because he is more interested in the level of personal
rents (due to the fact that ￿
P ￿ 1
￿). If the competence of the politician and the share
of the output consumed are high enough, this negative tendency is compensated, and
the politician is able to extract higher rents still generating the required level of output.
Thus, if the competence level of the politician is high enough (Appendix A.4), the case
of PM is strengthened by greater ego-rent from holding the o¢ ce.
The politician with the highest competence level favours to maintain the decision
15making power if R increases.
Learning-by-doing ￿
It is obvious that the learning e⁄ect strengthens the delegation case from the point of
view of an incompetent politician. This type of o¢ ceholders is never reelected. Hence,
there are learning e⁄ects only in case of the external manager with long-term job contract.
With higher levels of competence ￿second order￿ e⁄ects come into existence: An
important role is played by the learning e⁄ect￿ s in￿ uence on the voters￿required level of
the output and thereby on the personal rent obtained in the ￿rst period. The logic is
as follows: due to the fact that the politician with higher-than-average competence level
(1 < ￿
P ￿ 1
￿) is more interested in the level of personal rents, the net e⁄ect of learning-
by-doing weakens the PM. The impact of the ￿pure￿learning e⁄ect ￿ on the decision to
delegate equals zero because both the politician and the external manager will hold the
o¢ ce for both periods. The latter holds for most competent politicians as well.
Career concerns ￿
Stronger career concerns have a positive e⁄ect on the choice whether to delegate the
decision making power to an external manager. This e⁄ect is independent from the
politicians￿competence levels. The stronger the linkage of manager￿ s rent to the produced
output level, the smaller the probability that he will be diverting resources given his
competence level. In other words, parameter ￿ has a direct impact on manager￿ s diligence
and raises the expected output from the external manager. The last term on the left-hand
side of inequalities (38), (42) and (45) describes the negative e⁄ect of the possibility to
divert maximum amount of resources ￿ r on the level of SWF￿ s output (weighted with the
measure of uncertainty ￿ due to de distribution of mangers competence ￿
m). This e⁄ect
is alleviated by the disciplining function of career concerns and multiplied by ￿ because
the politician is only interested in the share of output that can be consumed by himself.
In general, the career concerns described by linking manager￿ s rent to the generated
output allegorise a kind of mechanism for the external manager that disciplines him and
forces him to be more diligent.
Transparency e⁄ects on the average output of SWF em
The parameter em in our simple theoretical model framework captures the e⁄ect of
increased transparency on the SWF￿ s average output due to the involvement of an external
manager. The outsourcing of the SWF￿ s management signals the commercial nature of
the fund￿ s activities. In turn, this ensures the international legitimacy of the SWF and
opens the entry to markets and industries that might be inaccessible for opaque, foreign
government run investment authorities. From the perspective of simple portfolio theory
the latter improves portfolio diversi￿cation options and results in higher average returns.
16At ￿rst, it is obvious that the higher the average output of the SWF with an external
manager, the more attractive the case for delegation from the perspective of any politician.
However, it makes more sense to look at the di⁄erence between average outputs of SWF
under both alternative regimes. And in this case, the competence level of each particular
politician plays an important role. The expressions in ￿rst brackets of each condition (38),
(42) and (45) demonstrate that the higher the competence of the incumbent politician,
the greater has to be the increase of the average output due to the transparency gain in
order to make the delegation justi￿able from point of view of the politician. However,
the e⁄ect of increased average output on the delegation decision is weakened through
the parameter ￿ because the politician is only interested in the share of output that he
consumes. One can see that smaller ￿ dilute the e⁄ect of greater em.
The range of uncertainty about the competence level of the external man-
ager ￿
In Appendix A.4, it is shown how the parameter ￿ describing the range of uncertainty
a⁄ects the incumbent￿ s decision to delegate the policy tasks in the SWF. The rationale
is valid from the perspective of each particular o¢ ceholder with given competence level
because there exists uncertainty only about the manger￿ s behaviour. Therefore, ￿ a⁄ects
only the expected output of the external management. The expected output is a⁄ected
by ￿ through two channels: The probabilities that the external manager will be diverting
resources in each period and the expected level of his competence (given that he will
be negligent). The latter increases in ￿. This has a negative impact on the politician￿ s
delegation decision because, given that the external manager will be diverting resources,
higher expected competence implies higher opportunistic costs of delegation in the form
of foregone output associated with diverted resources. The reaction of the diverting
probability in the ￿rst period to ￿ depends on the critical value 1
￿+￿ (compare (23) and
Appendix A.1).
In the case that the manager￿ s career concerns are weak, so that 1
￿+￿ ￿ 1, the proba-
bility of being negligent increases in ￿. This implies that both e⁄ects act simultaneously
in the same direction. Thus, in this case the delegation is more attractive from the
politician￿ s point of view the greater the uncertainty about the competence of the
candidates (the smaller ￿).
With strong enough career concerns, so that 1
￿+￿ < 1, the probability e⁄ect turns to
the opposite direction and the both e⁄ects mentioned above have to be weighed against
each other. For high enough ￿ the probability e⁄ect dominates and makes the delegation
more attractive with smaller uncertainty (greater ￿).
Summing up, one can see the interaction between uncertainty about candidate￿ s com-
petence and career concerns. In general, the disciplining e⁄ect of career concerns is op-
17posite to the uncertainty impacts: Greater uncertainty about the ability of the external
manager makes the politician manage the SWF by himself. But if it is known that the
candidates have strong enough concers about the future, this e⁄ect is alleviated.
The maximum possible amount of diverted resources ￿ r
The impact of the maximum possible amount of resources that can be diverted on the
delegation decision depends on the competence level of the politician holding the o¢ ce.
The o¢ ceholder with the highest competence level (￿
P > 1
￿) never diverts resources.
However, there is a probability that the external manager will be diverting. So the
increase in level of resources allowed to divert reduces the expected output of the SWF
under EM and has a negative e⁄ect on the delegation. But if there exists a strong enough
disciplining mechanism for the manager, this will reduce the negative e⁄ect of diverting
resources.
The comparison of (40) and (43) (Appendix A.4) shows that the e⁄ect of ￿ r is likely
to be negative in the case of a bad politician (￿
P ￿ 1) if ￿ and ￿





). The intuition is that the politician diverts always the maximum possible
amount of resources because ￿
P ￿ 1. There is also a positive probability that the external
manager will be diverting ￿ r. The smaller the part ￿ of the output consumed by the
politician the stronger his preference to keep the decision making power for himself in
order to have a possibility to divert resources.
The argument described above is valid for the politician with the higher-than-average
(1 < ￿
P ￿ 1
￿) competence as well. But there are also other additional e⁄ects because ￿ r
a⁄ects the voters￿required level of output ~ y and the personal rent extracted in the ￿rst
period ~ r1. Namely, on the one hand, the increase of ￿ r raises the output and reduces
the extracted rent, making the case of PM less attractive (because the politician is more
interested in rents due to the fact that ￿
P ￿ 1
￿). On the other hand, the increase of ￿ r
reduces the expected output generated under EM. If the parameter ￿ is small enough, the
reduction of ~ r1 under PM becomes insigni￿cant, and the expected output consumed by the
politician under EM becomes smaller (not only because ￿ is the share of output consumed
but also due to the fact that the decrease of ￿ raises the probability of diverting). These
e⁄ects in all make the case of delegation less attractive if ￿ is small enough.
To summarise, the e⁄ect of ￿ r on the delegation decision relies inter alia on the incum-
bent￿ s competence level and on the SWF nature: For example, from the perspective of
an average competent politician holding the o¢ ce in a SWF producing a public goods
(￿ = 1) the delegation can be more attractive the higher ￿ r.
The share of the SWF￿ s output consumed by each individual ￿
On the one hand, the parameter ￿ describes the share of SWF￿ s output that is con-
sumed by each individual and accordingly by the politician as well. But on the other
18hand, ￿ de￿nes also the critical competence level of the external manager which is im-
portant for his resource-diverting behaviour: The probability of being negligent decreases
in ￿. Due to the fact that the delegation decision is based just on the comparison of the
output shares that can be consumed under both alternative regimes, greater ￿ might have
an negative impact from the point of view of the competent politician with ￿
P > 1
￿. This
occurs if the a priori transparency gain from the external management expressed by the
increase of the average output is not high enough (em < ￿
Pe). Comparing the expressions
(41) and (44) (Appendix A.4) one can see that in the case of an incompetent o¢ ceholder
the e⁄ect of increasing ￿ tends to be positive even if em just exceeds e.
The e⁄ects mentioned above are also valid for the incumbent with higher-than-average
competence level (1 < ￿
P ￿ 1
￿). But there are again additional e⁄ects due to the fact
that the increase of ￿ raises the voters￿required level of output and reduces the extracted
personal rent in the ￿rst period, making the case of PM less attractive (because ￿
P ￿ 1
￿).
The last two terms of the expression (47) demonstrate this negative impact.
Summing up, the bad incumbent tends to delegate with higher shares of the SWF￿ s
output that can be consumed. However, there is greater possibility that the e⁄ect of
increasing ￿ on the delegation decision will be negative from the perspective of the incum-
bent with higher-than-average competence. The reason is that there exist ￿second order￿
e⁄ects created by the election mechanism while the politician with the highest ability
just compares consumption possibilities. An important role in the delegation decision is
played by the transparency e⁄ect￿ s in￿ uence on the average output generated under EM
which is depicted in our model by the parameter em.
Appendix A.5 shows whether the delegation improves the social welfare. It is shown





￿) competence level if the delegation occurs, it is always socially optimal.
However, in the case of an incompetent o¢ ceholder (￿
P ￿ 1) this result is probably dis-
torted by an inverse incentive provided by the value of the o¢ ce R: Higher ego-rents from
holding the o¢ ce lead the incompetent politician to delegate in order to get reelection
chances because otherwise he is never reelected. Therefore, with higher R delegation is
possible even if the output generated by the politician exceeds the expected output from
EM. This occurs due to the fact that the delegation decision is driven by the expectation
for higher ego-rent. One can see that under certain circumstances the delegation does not
take place even though it would improve social welfare.
7 Conclusion
In this paper I developed a simple two period model with elections at the end of the
￿rst period in order to examine the incentives underlying the decision of a politician to
19delegate the management of a sovereign wealth fund to an independent external manager.
Through the mechanism of elections the voters not only get the possibility to control the
moral hazard problem but also try to solve the adverse selection problem of the incum-
bent. Although the model is de￿ned in a general manner it introduces also speci￿c details
describing the functioning of SWFs. The model contains some special components de-
scribing the policy task delegation issues that have been studied separately in the previous
literature. I combine these building blocks and formalise the delegation motives: learning
e⁄ects (Arrow 1962) and the increase of SWF￿ s average return due to the management
outsourcing. The latter signals the commercial nature of SWF￿ s investment decisions and
improves portfolio diversi￿cation options (Rozanov 2009). On the other side, I build in
two disciplining mechanisms for the politician and for the external manager: elections
(Persson, Roland and Tabellini 1997) and career concerns (Holmstr￿m 1999). The politi-
cian weighs the costs of not being manager of the SWF in the form of forgone personal
rents and the possible loss of having an incompetent manger against the bene￿ts from
transparency e⁄ects, learning-by-doing and disciplining career concerns. The politician
loses with delegation the possibility to signal his competence to electorate using the SWF￿ s
output. However, this turns into an advantage for incompetent incumbents because the
delegation delivers reelection chances.
Furthermore, several lessons become apparent from the model. One is that the in-
crease of SWF￿ s average productivity as a consequence of management outsourcing and
fund￿ s higher transparency improves social welfare. However, the in￿ uence of increased
productivity on the politician￿ s delegation motivation is strongly linked to the compe-
tence level of the o¢ ceholder and to the character of a SWF: The positive e⁄ect on
delegation motives is strongest if there is a SWF providing public goods (for example,
an infrastructure fund). Another is that if the delegation occurs, it is socially optimal
if the ego-rent of holding the o¢ ce is small enough. Higher ego-rents from a political
o¢ ce deliver incentives for the incompetent politician to delegate the policy task in order
to obtain a reelection chance even if the expected output from the external managerial
regime is small. However, the reverse is not true, i.e. under certain circumstances the
management of SWF won￿ t be delegated even if the delegation improves social welfare.
The ￿pure￿e⁄ect of learning-by-doing on the delegation decision plays an important role
only in the case of an incompetent politician. Since incumbents with higher competence
have the possibility to win the elections, the ￿pure￿learning e⁄ect completely disappears
and ￿second order￿e⁄ects arise. These act through election mechanism increasing the
required and at the same time the produced output level and reducing the possibility to
extract personal rents from the o¢ ce. However, this weakens the case of the political
management and delivers an additional incentive to delegate because the average com-
petent politician is more interested in personal rents. The range of uncertainty about
20manager￿ s competence plays an interesting role on the delegation decision: In most cases,
the smaller is the uncertainty about manager￿ s ability, the more attractive is the delega-
tion of SWF￿ s management from the politician￿ s perspective. However, if the disciplining
e⁄ect of career concerns is small enough, greater uncertainty may reduce the probability
of being negligent and may thereby improve the delegation.
To conclude, I underline some limitations of the framework and indicate some direc-
tions for further research. Perhaps one of the most important limitations is the assumption
of only two periods in our model. But although the existence of the ￿last￿period and
the absence of elections after the second period lead incumbents to behave in a negligent
way in their ￿nal term, there exist incentives for voters to elect the most possible com-
petent politician from the pool of candidates. The extension of time horizon would not
only solve this last-period-problem but also help to avoid the limitations in election rule.
I considered ￿myopic￿voters who are interested only in reelecting the incumbent if he
generates higher expected output in the second period relative to the randomly elected
new politician. The existence of several periods would deliver the possibility to examine
the behaviour of voters that maximize through elections their expected utility over the
whole time horizon which is more realistic. Another point is that I have assumed the
delegation to be a zero/one decision. The practice shows that a plenty of SWFs allocate
only some portions of their funds to external managers or launch new investment vehicles
that are managed externally. In respect thereof, one can address the question of optimal
degree of delegation from perspective of SWF as well as society.
I hope that the framework presented in this paper will be helpful in addressing these
important questions in future work.
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23A Appendix
A.1 Expected output of the SWF with a politician
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A.2 Expected output of the SWF with an external manager
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A.3 Comparison of outputs and the social optimum













































25A.4 Decision of the politician to delegate
1. Politician with ￿
P > 1
￿ (highest competence)






















(a) One can see that the case of the PM is strengthened if the ego-rent from holding
the o¢ ce increases. The competent incumbent is sure to be reelected and to
obtain R, while under EM the probability of reelection is just 1
2.
(b) Stronger career concerns have also a positive e⁄ect on the decision to delegate.
(c) It is obvious that, ceteris paribus, the greater the average output em of the
SWF under EM, the better is the delegation for the politician. But this e⁄ect
is linked to the parameter ￿. If ￿ is small enough the e⁄ect of higher em becomes
insigni￿cant.













The impact of the parameter ￿ on the delegation decision depends on the critical
value 1
￿+￿ which on his part a⁄ects the manager￿ s diligence. The parameter ￿






































This implies that the greater the uncertainty about the competence of
the candidates (the smaller ￿), the more attractive the delegation for the
politician.
ii. If 1








@￿ > 0 and
@E(￿mj￿m￿ 1
￿+￿ )
@￿ > 0. If the
￿rst e⁄ect dominates (and this is true for high enough ￿), the delegation
becomes more attractive for the incumbent the smaller the uncertainty
(the greater ￿).
26(e) The ￿rst derivative of the left-hand side of (38) with respect to ￿ r is:












The expression in ￿rst parentheses is always nonnegative for ￿;￿ > 0. The
smaller ￿ the greater is the possibility that the whole expression becomes neg-
ative.





2(￿+￿)2 for two di⁄erent ￿
(f) The ￿rst derivative of the left-hand side of (38) with respect to ￿ is:
2(e
m ￿ ￿












where the expression in second parentheses is always nonnegative. In the case
of em > ￿
Pe and ￿ > ￿ the whole expression becomes positive.
2. Politician with ￿
P ￿ 1 (low competence)





















2 ￿ ￿ r ￿ ￿ r￿￿
P (42)
(a) One can easily prove that in contrast to the case with good politician (￿
P > 1
￿)
in this case of a bad one (￿
P ￿ 1) the PM is weakened if the ego-rent from
holding the o¢ ce increases.
(b) It is also obvious that learning e⁄ect ￿ strengthens the delegation case.
(c) The greater ￿, the better is the delegation.
27(d) Greater di⁄erence between average outputs of SWF under both regimes (em ￿ e)
improves the delegation. However, this e⁄ect is linked to the parameter ￿. If ￿
is small enough the e⁄ect of higher em becomes insigni￿cant.
(e) The e⁄ect of the range of uncertainty (or parameter ￿) about the competence
of candidates remains the same (compare (38) and (42)).














where the expression becomes positive if ￿ and ￿ are high enough.
(g) The ￿rst derivative of (42) with respect to ￿ is:
(2e
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2 + ￿ + ￿
P￿ r (44)
where the whole expression becomes de￿nitively positive if ￿ > ￿.
3. Politician with 1 < ￿
P ￿ 1
￿ (higher-than-average competence)




















































P (1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿ (45)
(a) One can see that the impact of the ego-rent from holding the o¢ ce on the
delegation decision is ambiguous. If the competence level of the politician is
high enough (i.e. ￿
P (1 + ￿) > 2), the case of the PM is strengthened.
(b) Both the politician and the external manager will hold the o¢ ce for both
periods so that the ￿pure￿learning e⁄ect is not relevant. The only thing that
plays an important role is the learning e⁄ect￿ s in￿ uence on the required level
of the output and thereby on the personal rent obtained in the ￿rst period.
(c) The greater ￿, the better is the delegation.
(d) The greater the average output of the SWF under EM relative to the alternative
PM￿ s average output, the more attractive is the delegation for the politician.
(e) The e⁄ect of the range of uncertainty (or parameter ￿) about the competence
of candidates remains the same (compare (38) and (45)).
28(f) The ￿rst derivative of the left-hand side of (45) with respect to ￿ r is:



















Comparing the expressions (40) and (46) one can show that the e⁄ect of ￿ r is
likely to be negative if ￿ is small enough.
(g) The ￿rst derivative of (45) with respect to ￿ is:
￿
2e







































A.5 Comparison between Delegation and Social Optimum
Case 1 Politician with ￿
P > 1
￿ (highest competence)
In the case of the incumbent with highest competence level if the delegation occurs,
it is always socially optimal (but not vice versa).
Proof. The output generated by the politician is:
Y = ￿
Pe + ￿
Pe + ￿ (48)
The expected output generated under the EM is given by equation (30). Rewriting the









In turn, this implies E(Y EM) ￿ Y ￿ 0
Case 2 Politician with ￿
P ￿ 1 (low competence)
In this case there exist a possibility that the delegation occurs even if it is socially not
optimal.
Proof. The expected output generated by the PM is:
Y = ￿
P(e ￿ ￿ r) + ￿
P(e ￿ ￿ r) (50)
29The expected output generated under the EM is given by equation (30). Rewriting the









In turn, this implies that for R ￿ 2￿ r
E(Y
EM) ￿ Y ￿ 0 (52)
And for R > 2￿ r there exist possibilities that E(Y EM) ￿ Y < 0
Case 3 Politician with 1 < ￿
P ￿ 1
￿ (higher-than-average competence)
In this case if the delegation occurs, it is always socially optimal (but not vice versa).
Proof. The output generated by the politician is:
Y = ~ y + ￿
P(e ￿ ￿ r) + ￿ (53)
The expected output generated under the EM is given by equation (30). Rewriting the





￿ Y ) ￿ R + ￿ r + ~ r1 (54)
In turn, this implies E(Y EM) ￿ Y ￿ 0
30